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A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: 
THE REPRESENTATION OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON AND 
WOMEN IN THE NEW YORK TIMES 
_______________________ 
SUSANNE KOPF 
In: M. Canelo et al (eds), Discourses that matter. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge 
Scholars Pub. 
Introduction: Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) allows for a very open approach to linguistic 
material. It uses various methods and different definitions of salient concepts, 
such as “critical” and “discourse.” Hence, a clarification of these terms is 
essential before moving on to the actual analysis. According to Litosseliti and 
Sunderland, a linguistic perspective of the term “discourse” refers to language 
material in both spoken and written form that goes beyond the individual 
sentence—the researchers state that discourse is “language which 
communicates a meaning in a context” (2002, 9). 
Norman Fairclough’s understanding of discourse includes the larger social 
context and, as a consequence, the importance of CDA’s essential principle, 
namely that it is vital to consider the societal context, becomes clear. Fairclough 
states that discourse is a form of “social practice, rather than a purely individual 
activity or a reflex of situational variables” ([1992] 2010, 63). Understood in 
this way, discourse is a way of people acting upon each other and/or the world 
by using language — discourse is seen as a “mode of action.” Aside from this, 
discourse is, of course, also a means of representing the world and the 
people/groups in it in certain, socially structured ways—discourse is a “mode of 
representation” (ibid.). 
Fairclough states that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse, that 
is to say, linguistic social practice, and non-linguistic social practice. He claims 
that societal structures are constituted by discourse while, at the same time, 
discourse is constituted by the societal order (ibid., 63–64). In 1997, Fairclough 
and Wodak developed a comprehensive definition of discourse including this 
notion: 
CDA sees discourse — language use in speech and writing—as a form of “social 
practice.” Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical 
relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), 
institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: the discursive event is 
shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially 
constitutive as well as socially conditioned — it constitutes situations, objects 
of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and 
groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and 
reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to 
transforming it. (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 5–6) 
In light of this definition and, in particular, given the indicated connection 
between language use and societal background, it becomes clear that Critical 
Discourse Analysis can offer its most comprehensive and satisfactory results 
when the broader societal context is included in the analysis. 
An additional important aspect with respect to the terminology of Critical 
Discourse Analysis is Fairclough’s differentiation between two forms of 
discourse. On the one hand, he establishes that the uncountable noun 
“discourse” refers to spoken/written language as a form of social practice (see 
above). On the other hand, Fairclough defines discourse as a count noun that 
refers to structured language use to convey a certain viewpoint on a field of 
social practice (Fairclough 1995, 135). One example is the use of the discourse 
of “war/battle” when political candidacies are discussed: “He attacked his 
opponent and was defeated at the final elections,” for instance. The given 
sentence is part of a large amount of language material—the discourse (in the 
uncountable sense) — that surrounds political candidacies. The given part of 
the discourse exemplifies the discourse (count noun) of “war/battle.” The given 
sentences effectively hide the idea that candidates could cooperate. This effect 
is achieved by using words such as “attacked,” “opponent,” and “defeated” 
(which belong to the discourse of “war/battle”). 
Another relevant concept connected to Critical Discourse Analysis is the idea of 
“critique.” Wodak and Meyer state that “critical” refers to several aspects of 
Critical Discourse Analysis. One understanding of “critical” (in the context of 
CDA) is that researchers should aim at uncovering power relations and 
exposing inequalities that persist in society (Lê and Lê 2009, 7). Additionally, 
Wodak and Meyer’s understanding of “critical” is that the investigated “text” 
should always be considered in its embeddedness in the social background. 
They further emphasize that “critical” in the context of Critical Discourse 
Analysis means that researchers should be aware that they cannot give a neutral 
and unbiased insight into power relations and the world in general — Wodak 
and Meyer urge researchers to take a careful, self-reflective and selfconscious 
stance (2009, 6-7). 
Social Practice 
Gender and Sex 
This work of Critical Discourse Analysis is based in particular on the conception 
of social practice as constituting and constituted by discourse. As a 
consequence, it is important to discuss several relevant aspects of social 
practice, which might have shaped the New York Times’ representation of Hillary 
Rodham Clinton and of women in general. In turn, it is worthwhile to consider 
which parts of the societal status quo might be affected by the New York Times’ 
representation of the candidate and women. 
One important aspect of social practice in the context of Clinton’s 
representation in the New York Times is the concept of gender, which — for the 
purpose of this essay—refers to socially constructed aspects that lead to the 
identification of “woman” or “man,” in contrast to the (allegedly) biologically 
given sex. U.S. society is among the many Western societies that allow only for 
two sex categories—female and male. Furthermore, the sexes are connected to 
the socially constructed genders—femininity and masculinity (Disch 2003, 91). 
Although gender and sex are seen as separate but connected in certain ways for 
the purpose of this essay, it is important to take note, briefly, of Butler’s work 
in this context. She argues that assuming a distinct separation of biological sex 
and socially constructing gender does not do. Rather, Butler suggests that the 
body — that sex itself — is a construct that is gendered already (1990, 6–7). 
As mentioned above, this essay uses the idea of a societal connectedness 
between the separate concepts sex and gender as a basis. In this context, it is 
remarkable that this sex/gender connection is so strong that gender markers 
are perceived as reliable sources from which to draw conclusions with respect 
to a person’s biological sex and, generally speaking, U.S. society does not even 
perceive sex and gender as separate concepts. Halberstam’s “Bathroom 
Problem” proves this point: biological males who exhibit feminine gender 
markers or behavior tend to be miscategorized as “female” since the identifier 
assumes femininity markers to be inextricably connected to femaleness or even 
assumes that femininity and femaleness are “the same” rather than two very 
separate concepts. As a consequence, feminine males’ “mistake” is pointed out 
to them when visiting the men’s room (2004, 21). 
Halberstam’s “Bathroom Problem” shows that it is the sex of a person that is 
expected to “match” the bathroom (e.g. a male in men’s bathroom): as long as, 
for example, femaleness is given, “incongruent” gender markers (e.g. masculine 
markers) do not lead to expulsion from a women’s bathroom. Hence, the 
“Bathroom Problem” exemplifies that sex is at the core of the identification 
“women” and “men”—assumed femaleness is essential to being recognized as 
“woman” (ibid., 21). 
In addition, the situation is not easily resolved once it is clear that a person is 
in the “correct” bathroom, that is to say, a male in the men’s room or a female 
in the women’s room, despite sex/gender incongruence. Rather, Halberstam 
argues that such an individual might still be perceived as deviant, as somehow 
“not-man” or “not-woman” due to the broken connection between biological 
sex and expected gender behavior/identity. According to Halberstam, 
perceived sex/gender incongruence might lead to negative or hostile and 
derogatory reactions (ibid., 21–23). Some of the problematic aspects of 
sex/gender incongruence are dealt with in more detail in the discussion of 
Coates’s “catch-22” (2004, 201–02) and Anderson’s “Bitch Narrative” (1999, 
599–605) later in this essay. 
In U.S. society, men are considered the norm-group and women the deviant, 
not-norm, and subordinated group (Lorber 2003, 98–99). Generally, groups 
constituting the norm in society are not perceived as groups of a society but as 
the standard that constitutes society. Simone de Beauvoir states that this 
phenomenon applies to the division of “men” and “women,” with “men” as the 
standard. She claims that “humanity is male and man defines woman not as 
herself but as relative to him” and refers the reader to Aristotle’s proclamation 
that women are defined as women (and not men) due to a “lack of qualities” 
([1949] 1956, 15). As a consequence, the deviant “woman” is automatically 
defined as a group in society that lacks certain (male/masculine) qualities, that 
is not-man (Lorber 2003, 99). 
The Dominant Femininity, Emotion and the Work-Family Conflict 
The dominant concept of femininity in the United States is characterized by 
several aspects. Firstly, due to the aforementioned connectedness of gender and 
sex, “femaleness” is expected and feminine females are most likely to be 
identified as “women.” Secondly, Buddhapriya claims that women are 
perceived in terms of features such as “dependence, passivity and emotionality” 
(1999, 18). She further explains that women are very often perceived as “weak 
and passive, more capable of being led than leading” (ibid.). In addition, this 
dominant femininity is closely associated with family life. Women are defined 
in terms of their role in the domestic sphere, for example as mothers rather than 
in terms of their profession (MacDonald 1998, 132). Coates draws similar 
conclusions and claims that women are likely to be seen in terms of caring and 
selfsacrificing motherhood (2004, 139–40). 
One tangible effect of the idea that women belong to the private sphere and are 
caring, loving individuals is the so-called “work-family conflict” (Gornick and 
Meyers 2009, 8). According to Gornick and Meyers, the traditional family 
model “man = breadwinner” and “woman = home maker,” which indicates a 
high degree of separation of men and women into their assigned sector, 
changed gradually throughout the 20th century (ibid., 7–8). However, Gornick 
and Meyers claim that, to this day, the dissolution of the model remains only 
partial. Even though women joined the workforce, they still hold the position 
as the family’s major caregivers in most OECD countries. Nowadays, women 
are expected to fully participate in the public sphere, while, at the same time, 
they have to meet the demands of the private space (ibid., 8). Consequently, 
women in the USA and other OECD countries struggle with balancing both 
sectors — they struggle with the “work-family conflict.” 
In order to find further characteristics of the dominant version of femininity in 
the United States, it is worth taking into account characteristics connected to 
emotion and emotionality. According to Lutz as well as Nunner-Winkler, 
emotions (and expressing emotions) are connected to women (feminine 
females), whereas the perceived polar opposite “rationality” applies to women’s 
“opposite”—men (masculine males) (Nunner-Winkler 2008, 91; Lutz 1996, 
151). Lutz even claims that the “qualities that define the emotional also define 
women” (ibid.). Hence ideas and qualities connected to emotion are the same 
as the ideas and characteristics that are connected to femininity in the United 
States. 
Lutz claims that there are two prevalent perspectives on emotion. On the one 
hand, there is the idea of emotion as something fundamentally human, positive 
and humane, something that enables us to form meaningful interpersonal 
relationships, whereas the absence of emotion signifies social distance and 
alienation (ibid.). On the other hand, there is a less positive perspective on 
emotion, and on women due to their connectedness to emotion. Lutz states that 
emotion is also seen  
as something natural rather than cultural, irrational rather than rational, 
chaotic rather than ordered, subjective rather than universal, physical rather 
than mental or intellectual, unintended and uncontrollable, and hence often 
dangerous. (Ibid.) 
According to Lutz’s understanding of emotion, emotions cannot be planned or 
controlled. However, emotions and expressing them are not the same. 
In this context, Brody explains that societies have “display rules” (2000, 25). 
These are “prescriptive social norms that dictate how, when and where 
emotions can be expressed by [masculine] males and [feminine] females” 
(ibid.). As a rule, women in the USA are expected to show more emotion than 
men, except for aggression and anger, for instance. According to Brody, women 
are identified with self-conscious emotions, such as grief, sadness or shame, 
and are more likely than men to receive societal support, in the form of comfort 
or approval when exhibiting such emotions (ibid.). 
Masculinity, Leadership and the “Bitch Narrative” 
In a discussion of Clinton’s representation in the New York Times it is further 
important to consider the dominant idea of leadership prevalent in the United 
States. Sczesny and others explain that society’s views on leadership and 
femininity are incongruent (2004, 633). Garcia-Retamero and López-Zafra 
even claim that leadership is perceived as masculine (2006, 52) and 
Buddhapriya supports this by stating that many of the qualities assigned to 
masculinity are perceived as prototypical leadership traits (1999, 18). Due to 
the societal connectedness of masculinity with maleness, leadership is 
associated with men in general. Consequently, women (feminine females) are 
considered to be lacking leadership qualities. In addition, leadership and 
masculinity/men are set in diametrical opposition to emotion and 
femininity/women. 
According to Buddhapriya, the dominant conception of leadership — apart 
from its connection to masculinity — includes features such as “assertiveness, 
emotional stability and ambition” (ibid.). Additionally, the stereotypical leader 
is expected to be self-reliant, “tough, unemotional [sic] and dominant” (ibid.), 
and, due to the connectedness of “men” and “leadership,” “dominant, strong, 
independent, aggressive, and knowledgeable” (Gaffney and Blaylock 2010, 5). 
Societal expectations concerning leadership and femininity present women 
with a dilemma, or — as Coates calls it — a “catch-22” (2004, 201–02): if women 
decide not to adopt masculine traits associated with the ideal of leadership, they 
are considered “too feminine” and unfit for leadership (Sczesny et al. 2004, 
633). Buddhapriya’s work supports this — the researcher states that women 
leaders are likely to be seen as “weak and passive, more capable of being led 
than leading,” as I have previously quoted (1999, 18). However, if women adopt 
sex/gender incongruent “masculine” behavior in order to fulfill the ideal of 
leadership, they are often seen as “hostile, arrogant, maladjusted and 
overbearing” (ibid.). 
Anderson discusses the very similar “Bitch Narrative” (1999, 599–605), which 
describes how women in political leadership positions are censored for 
exhibiting apparently gender/sex incongruent behavior by adopting a 
“masculine” leadership style. According to Anderson, Senate staffer Jean 
Dugan once said, “[y]ou do hear the term ‘bitch’ applied to women while their 
male counterparts are simply called ‘aggressive’” in U.S. American politics 
(1999, 603). All in all, society disapproves of women who exhibit apparently 
sex/gender incongruent, “masculine” behavior. 
Hillary Rodham Clinton and the New  York Times 
After having discussed salient aspects of U.S. social practice, it is now important 
to investigate how the representation of Clinton in the New York Times affects, 
and is affected by, these aspects of social practice. The article “Clinton’s 
Message, and Moment, Won the Day” will serve to exemplify issues regarding 
the representation of the Democratic presidential candidate and women in 
general (Healy 2008). It was published at a vital point during the presidential 
candidacy campaigns, namely in January 2008 after the Democratic pre-
elections in Iowa and New Hampshire. The pre-elections in these two states are 
considered particularly important since they give some indication as to who will 
be nominated the party’s actual presidential candidate. The focus of the article 
is an incident where Clinton allegedly exhibited emotions of sadness and 
exhaustion in her campaign effort for New Hampshire. Clinton lost Iowa to 
Obama but won in New Hampshire — the article discusses possible reasons for 
her victory and, in particular, focuses on how the candidate’s expression of 
emotion affected her campaign (ibid.). 
The article portrays emotion and expressing emotion as indicative of a lack of 
strength and experience. The following passage exemplifies this: “it [the 
expression of emotion] would badly undercut her [Clinton’s] message of 
strength and experience” (ibid.). Generally, this representation reiterates the 
existing understanding of “emotion” as the polar opposite of “leadership ideal” 
since it doubts the combinability of expressing emotions and strength (and 
experience). As mentioned above, strength is a core leadership ideal. However, 
the New York Times insinuates that Clinton’s expression of emotion contrasts 
with strength. Hence, the newspaper calls Clinton’s leadership abilities into 
question. This is remarkable, particularly since Clinton presented herself in 
terms of the dominant ideals of leadership: her “ability to be strong and 
uncompromising” (Adolphsen 2010, 40). Another point is that the New York 
Times weakens Clinton’s campaign by casting doubt on one of the pillars of her 
campaign efforts, namely her experience. According to Adolphsen, Clinton 
continuously emphasized her extensive experience and track record in political 
matters throughout the campaign (2010, 38-41). However, the New York Times 
implies that her expression of emotions damages precisely this message of 
experience. 
Furthermore, the New York Times also draws on the idea of emotion as indicating 
humanity and human connection (see section “The Dominant Femininity, 
Emotion and the Work-Family Conflict”), for example by referring to the 
expression of emotion as a “humanizing moment” with Clinton showing a 
“human side of herself that they [voters] had never seen” (Healy 2008). Even 
more importantly, the latter passage exemplifies that the newspaper stresses 
the rareness of Clinton showing emotion and, consequently, femininity (due to 
the aforementioned societal connectedness between emotion and femininity). 
This point is essential since Clinton had struggled with balancing feminine and 
masculine traits in her public persona before her presidential candidacy 
campaign (Anderson 2002, 115–18). Furthermore, Sklar claims that Clinton 
indeed preferred a masculine persona during her presidential candidacy 
campaign 2007–2008. The candidate exhibited allegedly sex/gender 
incongruent behavior—she behaved like “a woman pretending to be a man” 
(Sklar 2008, 320). To some extent, therefore, the newspaper merely picks up 
on a pre-existing attitude regarding the candidate by emphasizing the rareness 
of Clinton’s expressing emotion. The New York Times merely draws attention to 
what the public already assumes, namely that Clinton is mostly sex/gender 
incongruent. This emphasis on Clinton’s predominant sex/gender incongruent 
gender performance might have had negative repercussions concerning her 
reception by the public: Halberstam’s “Bathroom Problem” shows that, 
generally, sex/gender incongruence is met with hostility and distrust. 
Moreover, Anderson’s “Bitch Narrative” and Coates’s “catch-22” show that 
female masculinity, in particular, is not well received. 
A point connected to this is the representation of Clinton’s expression of 
emotion as a performance, as a strategy designed to gain favor with voters, 
particularly women voters. Throughout the article the discourse of 
“acting/theatre” is employed: “cast herself,” “display,” “appearance,” 
“performance,” “play” are a few examples of words used in reference to the 
candidate’s expression of emotion. In addition, the overlapping discourses of 
“warfare” and “competing/gaming” are used, for example by the repeated use 
of words such as “attack,” “strategy,” and “plan” (Healy 2008). By portraying 
the expression of emotion as a strategy-driven performance1, the New York 
Times implies that Clinton only performed sex/gender congruence when she 
expressed emotions in order to sway voters in her favor. In this way, Clinton is 
portrayed as attempting to hide her general sex/gender incongruence by 
occasionally performing sex/gender congruent “feminine/emotional” behavior. 
Hillary Rodham Clinton as a masculine female would, by default, fulfill the 
leadership ideals prevalent in the United States, for she possesses the necessary 
masculine” traits that constitute a good leader. However, due to the newspaper 
repeatedly doubting her leadership abilities throughout the article it is very 
unlikely, though possible, that the readers of the Times would draw this 
conclusion.  
One major way in which the New York Times casts doubt on the candidate’s 
leadership abilities throughout the article is the following: Clinton is repeatedly 
portrayed as depending on, and needing advice/help from, active campaign 
supporters and her husband, Bill Clinton. The repeated use of words such as 
“adviser” and “aide” shows this, since synonyms of these terms are: “authority, 
coach, . . . guide, helper . . .” whereas Obama’s active campaign supporters are 
called “associates,” which has the synonyms: “ally, collaborator, colleague, 
companion.“2 In addition, the newspaper correlates Clinton’s success with Bill 
Clinton’s popularity (Healy 2008). 
In this way, Clinton is portrayed in accordance with the gendered stereotype 
that women are seen as “weak and passive, more capable of being led than 
leading” (Buddhapriya 1999, 18). As a result, Clinton is represented as wholly 
unfit for leadership.  
1 Performance here is not to be confused with Judith Butler’s conception of 
gender as a performance, of gender identity as a “repetition of acts through 
time” rather than the expression of a stable identity (1990, 141). 
2 See Reverso-Collins Dictionary (2008). 





It is fascinating here that, apparently, this “feminine” representation is 
successful, despite the readers’ perception of Clinton as masculine. It can be 
concluded that the attachment of feminine gender stereotypes does not conflict 
with Clinton’s masculine persona due to the social practice of inextricably 
connecting femaleness and femininity. Clinton is female. Hence, feminine 
gender stereotypes can be used in her representation in spite of her sex/gender 
incongruent behavior. 
On the whole, when taking into account the aspects of social practice discussed 
in the previous section, Clinton’s representation in the New York Times can be 
summarized in three major points. Firstly, Clinton is portrayed as 
predominantly sex/gender incongruent—she is a masculine female. Secondly, 
Clinton performs sex/gender congruence in order to sway voters in her favor. 
Thirdly, due to the societal connectedness between sex and gender, Clinton is 
still described in terms of feminine gender stereotypes, which includes the 
implication of being unfit for leadership. 
Women and the New  York Times 
There are several noteworthy aspects to the New York Times’ representation of 
women. First of all, the New York Times treats women as a discrete sub-group of 
society. In doing so, the newspaper reflects and reinforces the social practice of 
perceiving “women” as a collective with the shared identifying feature of being 
“woman”; as a non-norm group that exists within society (see this essay’s 
section “Gender and Sex”). The New York Times constructs “women” as a discrete 
group, for instance, by implying that “several” individuals who share the feature 
“womanhood” can speak for the collective “women”: “Women, in particular, 
responded: Several said they . . .” (Healy 2008). In the given quotation the Times 
claims that the societal group “women” responded, when, in fact, only a number 
of individuals who are identified as belonging to the group “women” responded, 
namely “several.” 
Moreover, the New York Times reiterates that biological sex, that is, femaleness 
or maleness, is the essential constituent that creates the categories “woman” 
and “man.” In the course of a discussion of women voters’ reaction to Clinton’s 
expression of emotion, for example, the  Times introduces a new term in 
reference to these “women voters”: “Several female voters interviewed this week 
. . .” (Healy 2008; emphasis added). As a result, “women” and “female” are 
understood as identical — only people who are female are “women.” 
Additionally, the use of “female” in the New York Times when referring to 
“women” indicates and reinforces the tendency of society to blur the borders 
between biological sex and socially constructed gender. Since femaleness is 
difficult to determine from physique alone without requiring interviewees to 
undress in order to “prove” their femaleness, the Times obviously deduced 
biological sex by identifying gender markers. In spite of this, the newspaper 
informs the reader about biological sex (“female voters”), rather than gender 
identity, which is the only truly observable aspect. Thereby, the Times effectively 
blurs the borders between sex and gender. Moreover, the newspaper reinforces 
the practice of using gender markers to identify sex (see “Bathroom Problem,” 
section “Gender and Sex”). 
Furthermore, a combination of several of the hitherto discussed aspects of 
women’s representation in the Times yields remarkable results. The newspaper 
uses gender markers to deduce “femaleness” and then classifies “females” as 
“women.” Hence, femaleness does not equal womanhood. Rather, individuals 
who exhibit sufficient feminine gender markers to be judged female are then 
categorized as “women.” All in all, the Times does not contradict current social 
practices with this representation of “women.” 
The representation of women in the New York Times also reinforces the existing 
display rules for emotions, for example, by including the quotation “‘At first, I 
thought it was bad that she cried, but then I thought, she’s a woman, give her a 
chance’” (Healy 2008). The inclusion of this quotation construes Clinton’s 
womanhood as either an excuse for the expression of emotion or as some other 
form of reason/validation for why expressing emotion was not “bad,” after all. 
This quotation exemplifies that the display rules for women still hold true: 
women are entitled to express self-conscious emotions and are more likely to 
receive societal support for doing so than men. 
In addition, it can be argued that, in the article from January 2008, the New 
York Times reinforces the connection between “women” and “emotion” by 
discussing the effects of Clinton’s expression of emotion and then moving 
directly into a discussion of how women, in particular, responded: 
“We have absolutely no idea how her getting this emotional will play with 
voters,” one adviser said. It turned out to play phenomenally well, one of several 
turning points during Mrs. Clinton’s five-day sprint in New Hampshire after the 
Iowa caucuses that transformed the dynamic of her race against Senator Barack 
Obama for the Democratic presidential nomination. Women, in particular, 
responded: Several said they chose to vote for Mrs. Clinton at the last moment 
because she had shown a human side of herself that they had never seen. (Ibid.) 
Furthermore, the New York Times reports on women in terms of their 
interpersonal, mostly familial, relationships, for instance, “Estelle Glover, 57, 
an office manager whose son just returned from a tour of duty in Iraq . . .” 
(Healy 2008). This representation is in accordance with the dominant concept 
of femininity in the U.S, which includes a strong focus on family and domestic 
life. Interestingly, the newspaper mentions women’s interpersonal/familial 
relationships as well as their professional affiliation. This form of including 
women’s role in both the private and public spheres might be indicative of 
women’s active participation in both. It might be indicative of the existing work-
family conflict (Gornick and Meyers 2009, 8) many women experience, since 
today women are not only expected to fulfill their assigned roles as major 
caregivers in the private space any more, but are expected to contribute to the 
public sphere in equal measure as well. 
Conclusion 
A linguistic analysis of the representation of Hillary Rodham Clinton in the New 
York Times yields noteworthy results in itself. However, enriching such an 
analysis with information about the societal environment in which the given 
article was produced allows for comprehensive conclusions with regard to the 
effects that The Times’ portrayal of the candidate might have had. Only by 
investigating the complex connection between femininity/emotion and 
masculinity/leadership is it possible to conclude that most of Clinton’s 
representations in the newspaper might have had disadvantageous 
consequences in the context of a presidential candidacy campaign. 
In addition, it is remarkable that the representation of women in the New York 
Times does not differ significantly from given social practice in the United States 
of America. This conclusion proves the stability of current social practice, that 
is to say, it is highly improbable that the conception of femininity, for example, 
is going to change significantly in the foreseeable future. 
Still, I would like to emphasize that this essay can only present a short and 
rather one-dimensional insight into the workings of U.S. society. Future work 
in this field should include a broader spectrum of linguistic material, 
information on relevant discursive practices and a more in-depth insight into 
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